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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HOBERT T. OTTLEY, 
Plaintiff Mtd Appellant, 
-vs.-
LOIS R. HILL, 
Def endarnt an.d Respondent. 
Case 
No.11112 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and 
Brief in Support Thereof 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondent, Lois R. Hill, respectfully petitions the 
Court for a rehearing and reargu.ment of the above 
entitled case upon the following grounds: 
POINT I 
1'he Court's decision disregards the precise issue 
prrsented by respondent for consideration on appeal, 
Yiz., whether the proceeds of various insurance policies, 
uwlcr which a deceased minor child is an insured, for 
1 
hospital, medical and burial expenses, constitutes an 
estate of said minor. 
POINT II 
The Court's decision disregards long es ta blishod de-
cisional law to the effect that before appellant may re 
cover for hospital, medical and burial expenses in a 
wrongful death action it must be shown that the estate 
of decedent is insolvement and unable to pay such ex-
penses and that appellant has paid them or entered into 
a legally enforceable obligation to do so. 
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that the judg-
ment and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargu-
ment he permitted of the entire case. 
A brief in support of this position is filed herewith. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
CARMAN E. KIPP, EsQ. 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, EsQ. 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
D. Gary Chridian hereby certifies that he is attor-
ney for respondent petitioner herein, and that in his 
opinion there is good cause to believe the decision of the 
Court is erroneous and that the case should be reheard 
and reargued, as prayed for in said petition. 
- ~ /J"'-~1::1~1 PEI\. 
Dated this ___ ,':)~Jn- dt of~'- 1968. fK-£{~~1~ii~:~---
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BRIEF IN SUP'PORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS 
THE PRECISE ISSUE PRESENTED BY RE-
SPONDENT FOR CONSIDERATION ON AP-
PEAL, VIZ., WHETHER THE PROCEEDS OF 
VARIOUS INSURANCE POLICIES, UNDER 
WHICH A DECEASED MINOR CHILD IS AN 
INSURED FOR HOSPITAL, MEDICAL AND 
BURIAL EPENSES, CONSTITUTES AN ES-
TA TE OF SAID MINOR. 
At the time of the death of Trent Lee Ottley, the de-
ceased minor child of plaintiff, three policies of insurance 
\H're in force and effect. All of the policies had been 
applied for and the premiums thereon paid by plaintiff; 
liowen·r, under each of the policies (a Blue Cross policy, 
a Blue Shield policy and automobile liability insurance 
policy) the deceased minor child was an insured by the 
terms thereof. For example, the minor child was a mem-
ber of the Plan under both the Blue Shield and Blue 
Cross policies and as such member was entitled to all 
tht> benefits provided for him thereunder. Under the pol-
il':>' of automobile insurance issued by State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Company to plaintiff, the 
minor was an insured and as such, personally entitled to 
all thP rights provided for him thereunder. It is unques-
ti011ed and unquestionable that in the event of the death 
nf the insured minor child his personal representative 
woukl be entitled to the same rights that the child had 
3 
while he lived, i.e., payment of the hospital and medieal 
expenses resulting from his injury. There can be little 
question that the insured 's estate has a right to tlie 
benefits under the automobile liability insurance policy 
because it provides for payment of the funeral expense's 
of the insured. (See Limit of Liability - Coverage ,\1, 
automobile liability insurance policy.) 
The assets of a decedent's estate may be real, prr. 
sonal or equitable. Equitable assets are rights or inter. 
ests in either real or personal property requiring the aid 
of equity for their subjection, Agee v. Saunders, 12i 
Tenn. 680, 157 S.W.64, and are different from legal assets. 
Backhouse v. Patton, 5 Pet (U.S.) 160, 8 L.Ed. 82. The 
equity of redemption of a mortgage, forfeited in the lire. 
time of the mortgagor, is an equitable, and not a legal 
asset. So, too, is property subject to a general power of 
appointment executed by decedent. 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Ex-
ecutors and Administrators, Sec. 193. 
On the granting of Letters Testamentary or of Ad· 
ministration, all choses in action in favor of the decedent 
that survive his death pass to the executor or adminis-
trator, Re Nash's Estate (D. C. Virgin Islands), 255 F. 
Supp. 270; Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So.104; 
Ainsworth v. Ca.lifornia Barnk, 119 Cal. 470, 51 P.952; 
Biicharn.a;n v. Bucha;na.n, 75 N. J. Eq. 274, 71 A.745. Among 
the various choses in action the legal title of which passe3 
to the executor or administrator are notes, Cooper v. 
Hayward, 71Minn.174, 74 N.W.152; McBride v. Vance, 
73 Ohio St. 258, 76 N.E. 436; and other promises to pay 
money, Re Nash's Estate, Supra; Millard v. Brayton, 
4 
177 J\1 ass. 533, 59 N .E. 436; or judgments, indebtedness 
of clistributees, and rights to damage for the injury to 
property where the cause of action accrued in the life-
time of the testator or intestate. 31 Am. Jur. 2d op. cit. 
Hee. 198. 
The proceeds of a life insurance policy made payable 
to a named beneficiary are not assets of the estate of the 
insnn:d, but belong to the beneficiary under the policy; 
however, it is generally held that where a policy is pay-
ahle tc the insured or his executor, administrator, assigns 
or legal representatives, without designation of other 
beneficiaries, the proceeds thereof are payable to the 
rstat0 of the decedent insured and such proceeds consti-
tute general assets of the estate. 31 Am. Jur, op. cit. 
Sec. 200. 
In the instant case the facts show that plaintiff ap-
plied for and received policies of insurance providing for 
medical, hospital and burial expenses for himself and 
his family. Plaintiff paid the premiums on the policies 
hut in each case not only the deceased minor child, Trent 
Lee Ottley, but plaintiff's wife and each of his children, 
\\'ere insureds in their own right under each of the poli-
ries. The only thing required for them to remain insureds 
WaR that plaintiff pay the premium on each policy when it 
hecan:i.e due, which he did. The minor in question then 
was an insured under the terms of and pursuant to three 
third party beneficiary contracts. 
The rule of law in almost all American jurisdic-
t io11s is that a third person may, in his own right and 
5 
name, enforce a promise made for his benefit even thou~di 
he is a stranger both to the contract and to the considrrn 
tion. It is not necessary that any consideration mon 
from the third party and it is enough if there is sufficient 
consideration between the parties who make the agree. 
ment for the third party. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contract~, 
Sec. 302. 
H is generally held that where two persons make a 
contract for the benefit of a third person, by which !lit 
promisor agrees to perform a specific obligation which 
the promisee owed to such third person, who is showu by 
the contract to be its intended beneficiary, the third per 
son may maintain a suit or action directly against the 
promisor to enforce the contract. Phez Co. v. Salem 
Fruit Union, 103 Ore. 514, 201 P.222 reh. den. 103 Orr. 
547, 205 P.970. 
It is clear that the purpose usually mon11g the 
promisee to exact the provision from the promisor is to 
relieve himself of a debt or a duty, rather than to confer 
a benefit upon the third person, but nevertheless, accord-
ing to most courts, the fact that performance of the con-
tract would benefit the promisee in addition to the third 
person does not preclude the third person from enforcing 
the contract. Fidelity and D. Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala. 
262, 125 So.55; Carson Pirie Scott & Co. 1.:. Parrett, 346 
Ill. 252, 178 N.E.498; Ochs v. M. J. Carnahan Co., 42 Ind. 
App. 157, 76 N.E.788, 80 N.E.163; See also TYillisto11. 
Contracts 3d Ed. Secs. 361, 378 and 81 ALR 1286, 1288: 
148 ALR 359. 
6 
Addressing itself to the question of a child as the 
Jwueficiary to a contract between two other parties, 17 
Am. J11r. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 310, states in part as 
follows: 
In some American decisions the early English 
cases have been cited in support of the proposi-
tion that near relationship, such as that existing 
between father and child, may be taken to supply 
the place of a strictly legal right in the third per-
son. 8 On this view, moreover, seems to be found-
ed the rule that the privilege of naming a child 
may be waived by its parents and bestowed upon 
another; and when so bestowed in a contract with 
a third person for the benefit of the child, it rests 
on such privity between the parent and child as 
to enable the child to ratify the transaction and 
enforce the contract, 9 although the child's right to 
enforce the contract may be sustained on the 
ground that it has an interest in the name which 
it shall bear analogous to the interest which a 
child has in its own services. 10 More broadly, it 
has been held that a child may recover in his own 
name where a promise is made to a near relative 
of the child as the child's agent, for the benefit of 
the child, and upon a consideration which virtual-
ly affects the welfare and interest of the child 
himself, so that the consideration may be said to 
move in part from the child. 11 
As the Court said in its opinion in this case, "it was 
the duty of the plaintiff to support his son, if he is able 
to do RO, and that duty is imposed by Statute in this 
State. The duty of support includes the duty of furnish-
ing medical care and treatment." It is obvious, however, 
from the law cited herein, that plaintiff-appellant can 
7 
enter into a contract with another to relieve himself of 
the duty imposed on him, viz., he may take out a Blue 
Cross, Blue Shield and automobile liability insurance pol. 
icy whereby the various companies agree to pay any hos. 
pital, medical and burial expenses that might relate to hi8 
minor child, Trent Lee Ottley. This, of course, is exactly 
what plaintiff did. There is also no question that thr 
said, Trent Lee Ottley, or his estate could enforce the 
obligation to pay for such medical, hospital and burial 
expenses as imposed on the insurance companies under 
the various policies. 
The rights of the deceased minor child are then a11 
asset of his estate out of which hospital, medical and 
burial expenses must be paid, if the estate is able to pay 
them. In the instant case the value of this particular 
asset of the decedent's estate was sufficient to pay in full 
the items of expenses referred to. Hence, plaintiff 
should not be entitled to recover those items as damage~ 
against defendant herein since these amounts have al-
ready been paid by decedent's estate or the obligor of 
decedent's estate. 
8 
POINT II 
THJD COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS 
LONG ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL LAW 
TO THE EFFECT THAT BEFORE APPEL-
LANT MAY RECOVER FOR HOSPITAL, 
MEDICAL AND BURIAL EXPENSES IN A 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION IT MUST BE 
SHOWN THAT THE ESTATE OF DECE-
DENT IS INSOLVENT AND UNABLE TO 
PAY SUCH EXPENSES AND THAT AP-
PELLANT HAS PAID THEM OR ENTERED 
INTO A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE OBLI-
GATION TO DO SO. 
It seems clear that the Court based its decision in 
this case on the collateral source rule. Respondent does 
not argue with the validity of that rule, but does con-
tend that it is not applicable to the insant case. The 
collateral source rule would have application in this case 
only if the deceased infant left no estate ; and it is 
respondent's contention that decedent did leave an estate 
even though it consisted of only a contract right. If, in 
fact, the right of the deceased minor child or his per-
Honal representative to compel payment of the hospital, 
medical and burial expenses for his last illness and burial 
does constitute an estate then the law as heretofore pre-
scribed by this Court would come into play, thus obviat-
ing the applicability of the collateral source rule. 
Respondent again cites the following cases in sup-
port of is position herein. 
Morrision v. Parry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772 
(Hl4:J) holding that before plaintiff may recover for fu-
!J 
neral expenses in an action under the wrongful death 
statute, he must ehow that the estate is insolvent and 
unable to pay such funeral expenses, and that plaintiff 
or one of the heirs has paid or that he has entered into a 
legally enforceable obligation to pay them. 
In re Behm's Estate, ______ Utah ------, 213 P.2d 6G7 
( 1950) following the rule, established in Morris on Y. 
Perry, supra, that from proceeds realized under a claim 
for wrongful death, plaintiff husband, was entitled to 
recover the amount expended on his wife's last illncs~ 
and burial where the wife left no estate and the husband 
proved that he paid said amount. 
The case of Dauzat v. Great American Indem11i(11 
Company, et al, 130 So.2d 805 (1961) supports the posi-
tion taken by respondent both on the argument of this 
case on appeal and in its petition for a rehearing of this 
matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's decision which respondent seeks to haYe 
reargued and reheard ignores the question presented to 
the Court for disposition and disregards decisional law 
of thie and other states which logically and necessarily 
support respondent's position. As the decision is prrs-
ently constituted it is of no assistance to the trial court 
that made the initial ruling of the question presented nor 
does it help counsel involved other than to tell counsrl 
for plaintiff he can have his money. The real questiou 
of whether the contractual obligation of an insurance 
10 
company to one of its insured 's to pay for his funeral 
expenses is an asset of the insured 's estate upon his 
death out of which the funeral expenses must be paid 
remains unanswered. If so, under the law as presently 
constituted in this state, plaintiff cannot recover those 
rxpenses from defendant. If not, plaintiff may recover 
from defendant. 
Upon reflection and upon analysis of the decision 
referred to as it relates to prior cases of the Court, the 
decision should be recalled, the case reargued and, upon 
such event, the judgment of the trial court affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
11 
Attorneys for Defendant 
arnd Respondent. 
